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CRUMBLING PATCHWORK: MASSACHUSETTS'S
EFFORTS TO FILL THE GAPS LEFT BY
CRA WFORD ARE NOW REDUNDANT
Recent decisions by courts at all levels have made
a mess of Confrontation Clause analysis.
By
distinguishing between testimonial and non-testimonial
statements, and then choosing not to elaborate, the United
States Supreme Court wreaked havoc upon the state
courts' interpretation of hearsay jurisprudence. In
response, Massachusetts courts hastily constructed
guidelines to adjust to this development, but as the
Supreme Court continues to interpret the right of
confrontation, some of the Commonwealth's framework
has become redundantor inconsistent.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the Confrontation Clause, the United States Constitution gives
criminal defendants the right to confront their accusers.' That right has
ancient roots preceding the Constitution. 2 However, nearly as long as the
right to confront one's accusers has existed, exceptions have been
recognized.'
Until recently, the Supreme Court interpreted the
Confrontation Clause to include all the exceptions afforded to the hearsay
doctrine, as well as evidence that bore "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness" that indicated the statements were "reliable." 4 Eventually,
scholars, judges, and commentators criticized this approach, arguing that

I U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him .... )
2 See Frank R. Herrmann & Brownlow M. Speer, Facing the Accuser: Ancient and Medieval
Precursors of the Confrontation Clause, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 481 passim (1994) (examining
development of confrontation rights across western civilization).
3 See id. at 491-92 (identifying exception to right of confrontation circa 491 A.D.).
4 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) ("[W]hen a hearsay declarant is not present for
cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is
unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears adequate 'indicia of
reliability.' Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a
firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a
showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."), abrogated by Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2003).
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judges implementing the reliability standard had developed a confusing
body of caselaw that made predicting the admissibility of out-of-court
statements an unreliable process. 5 Seeking to remedy this perceived
unfairness, the Supreme Court rendered Crawford v. Washington.6 In that
decision, the Court held that under the Confrontation Clause, out-of-court
statements elicited by police interrogation were testimonial, and therefore
inadmissible, unless the defendant had the opportunity to cross examine the
declarant. 7
Crawford sent ripples through the legal community in three ways:
(1) it revealed that the protections provided by the Confrontation Clause are
separate from stare decisis hearsay; (2) it emphasized the need to
distinguish testimonial and non-testimonial out-of-court statements, but
failed to provide a clear definition of "testimonial statements"; and (3) it
suggested all statements made in the course of law enforcement

interrogations are testimonial, but lacked a clear description of what
constitutes an interrogation.8

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

5 See Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J.
1011, 1027 (1998) (criticizing reliability as "poor criterion" for hearsay exceptions and
Confrontation
Clause analysis). Confrontation Clause interpretation under Roberts was also criticized as overly
pedantic:

At common law, the traditional hearsay "rule" was notoriously un-ruly, recognizing
countless exceptions to its basic preference for live testimony; and more recent statutes
have proliferated exceptions. But the words and grammar of the Confrontation Clause
are emphatically rule-ish: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right ...to be confronted with the witnesses against him" no ifs, ands, or buts. And
so the modem Court has put itself in a bind. If the clause does truly prohibit all
hearsay, as its grammar might imply, it is utterly unworkable; but to make it
workable by recognizing commonsensical exceptions is to offend its seeming
grammar.
Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment FirstPrinciples, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 647 (1996). Instead of
using linguistic analysis and legal interpretation to clarify the Confrontation Clause, it seemed the
Roberts Court instead clouded the Framers' intent. Id. at 647-49.
6 See 541 U.S. 36, 60-65 (2004) (criticizing Roberts and considering Framers' perceptions of
confrontational rights).
7 Id. at 68; see also infra Part II.A (discussing Crawford).
8 See, e.g., Tom Lininger, Bearing the Cross, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1353, 1363-66 (2005)
(identifying unexpected challenges created by Crawford in criminal prosecutions, especially
domestic violence charges); Franny A. Forsman & Rene L. Valladares, Grappling With What
Statements are Testimonial Under Crawford v. Washington: "The Reasonable Expectation of the
Declarant" Test, NEV. LAW., Oct. 13, 2005, at 26, 26 (pointing out unresolved issues created by
Crawford); Adam Krischer, "Though Justice Alay Be Blind, It Is Not Stupid", PROSECUTOR,
Nov./Dec. 2004, at 14, 15-17 (describing effects of Crawford on forfeiture by wrongdoing
doctrine); see also infra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (describing Crawford's guidance on
how to identify interrogation).
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(SJC) addressed these issues in Commonwealth v. Gonsalves,9 clarifying
the definitions of "testimonial" and "interrogation," as well as creating a
two-part procedure courts could use to determine whether a statement is
testimonial per se or testimonial in fact. 10
Despite its initial value to the Massachusetts courts, Gonsalves has
become less applicable in the wake of the Supreme Court decisions in
Davis v. Washington" and Michigan v. Bryant,12 as these decisions have

caused the SIC to adjust its analytical method of evaluating the
admissibility of testimonial evidence.' 3 The Supreme Court, however, has
not addressed all the questions left open by Crawford, and Gonsalves
14
remains applicable in Massachusetts under some circumstances.
Nevertheless, to the extent Gonsalves can be interpreted to create
procedural steps or substantive law, it should be abandoned by all
15

Massachusetts courts.
II.

A DAM AGAINST HEARSAY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE

Despite its ancient roots, the right to confront one's accusers in the
American criminal justice system has evolved along with Western
civilization. 16 The Framers, who were familiar with Sir Walter Raleigh's

9

833 N.E.2d 549 (Mass. 2005), cert denied, 548 U.S. 926 (2006).

10 See infra Part II.B (discussing Gonsalves).
11 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
12 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011); see also infra Part II.B (describing value of Gonsalves after

Crawford); infra Part II.C (describing value of Davis v. Washington to Confrontation Clause
analysis); infra Part III.A (explaining value of Michigan v. Bryant to Confrontation Clause
analysis). The Supreme Court has also briefly touched upon the definition of "testimonial" in
other cases. See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2717 (2011) (ruling blood alcohol
test analyst's reports were testimonial under Crawford); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557
U.S. 305, 310-11 (2009) (ruling drug laboratory chemists' sworn certificates of analysis were
testimonial under Crawford).
13 See infra Part II.D (discussing SJC's adjustment to Confrontation Clause analysis after
Davis).
14 See infra Part IV (explaining lingering effects of Gonsalves).
15 See infra Part IV (explaining potential consequences of retaining distinct federal and state

Confrontation Clause analyses).
16 See Herrmann & Speer, supra note 2 passim (recounting development of defendants' right
to confront their accusers in Western civilization). An ancient predecessor to the modem
confrontation right is even mentioned in the Bible. See Acts 25:16 (New American Standard)
('[I]t is not tle cUstom of the Romans to give up any man before that the accused have the
accusers face to face, and have had opportunity to make his defense concerning the matter laid
against him."). While historical accounts indicate the ancient Romans allowed confessions (and
witness statements) obtained through torture, they also consistently indicate Roman justice
demanded defendants be present at their proceedings and that they meet their accusers face-to-
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infamous trial for treason, were influenced heavily by British common law
and saw fit to enshrine the right in the Sixth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. 17 For as long as the right has been recognized, courts have
made exceptions by allowing the admission of statements made by absent
persons into evidence.' 8 For a generation, the admissibility of these words

was controlled by hearsay common law and by the judiciary's notions of
the evidentiary reliability. 19 If the declarant was unavailable, their
statements remained admissible if the offering party showed "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness .' 2°

face. Herrmann & Speer, supra note 2, at 484-85. While written testimony by absent witnesses
was admissible under certain circumstances, when witnesses testified in person, as was preferred,
defendants had the right to cross-examination. Id. at 487-88.
17 See Richard J. Goldstone, Forward to WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, THE COMMENTARIES OF

iii, vvi (Amer. Bar Ass'n ed., 2009) (describing influence of British common law on Framers).
Compare id. at 460 ('[Defendants] shall have ... compulsive process to bring in his witnesses for
him, as was usual to compel their appearance against him."), with U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses
against him .... ). In 1603, Sir Walter Raleigh of England famously faced a false capital charge
of treason. See generally RENNELL RODD, Sm WALTER RALEIGH, 201-30 (1904) (detailing Sir
Walter Raleigh's false capital charge of treason). Raleigh's accuser, Lord Cobham, faced similar
charges, and only made his allegations after the prosecution falsely told him that Raleigh intended
to testify against him. Id. at 208-09. Cobham fabricated the allegations to get revenge against
Raleigh. Id. At Raleigh's trial the prosecution refused to examine Cobham directly, instead
relying upon the out-of-court statements he made under their false pretenses. Id. at 221. Raleigh
demanded the opportunity to face his accuser: "Let Cobham be here, let him speak it. Call my
accuser before my face ....
Herrmann & Speer, supra note 2, at 545. The judges refused his
demand on the most damning of rationales if Cobham were present, he might recant his
allegations, destroying the prosecution's case. See id. ("[T]o save [Raleigh], his old friend, it may
be that [Cobham] will deny all that which he hath said."). Later, one of the presiding judges
lamented that "the justice of England has never been so degraded and injured as by the
condemnation of Sir Walter Raleigh." 1 DAVID JARDINE, CRIMINAL TRIALS 435, 520 (1832).
SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, KNIGHT, ON TEE LAWS AND CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND i, at

18 See Peter Nicolas, 'I'm Dying to Tell You What Happened': The Admissibility of
Testimonial Dying Declarations Post-Crawford, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 487, 495 (2010)

(explaining pre-revolutionary roots of dying declaration exception to Confrontation Clause). The
dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule, for example, was a well-rooted fixture in British
common law in the Framers' time. See id. at 495-96.
19 See Friedman, supra note 5, at 1014-15 (describing confluence of hearsay common law
and Confrontation Clause jurisprudence).
20 See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington,
541
U.S. 36 (2004) (holding hearsay falling within "firmly rooted hearsay exception[s]" or bearing
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" admissible). The Federal Rules of Evidence,
codified during Roberts's influence, includes twenty-nine distinct hearsay exceptions, including
the amorphous Rule 807 the residual exception that renders the hearsay rule powerless if the
statement is evidence of a material fact, more probative on the point than any other evidence, and
the "purposes of the[] rules and the interests of justice" will be served, so long as the statements
bear "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness." See FED. R. EVID. 803-04, 807 (listing
exceptions to hearsay rule).
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A. The Levy Breaks: Crawford v. Washington
As a result of this open-ended policy, courts and academics
worried the ever-growing number of hearsay exceptions would render the
Confrontation Clause moot. 21 Uneasy with this development, the Supreme
Court recognized the procedural protections guaranteed by the
Confrontation Clause in Crawford v. Washington.22 In Crawford, the
prosecution sought to admit voice-recorded inculpatory statements made by
the defendant's wife to police while they were investigating the stabbing of
a man who allegedly attempted to rape her.23 Citing spousal privilege, she
refused to testify at trial.24 Over the defendant's objection, the prosecution
persuaded the trial court to allow the recording to be admitted, arguing it
was sufficiently trustworthy. 2' The defendant's appeal went all the way to
the Supreme Court, who unanimously held that the statement should have
been excluded because its admission
violated the defendant's Sixth
26
Amendment confrontation right.
Writing for the Court in Crawford, Justice Scalia declared that
judicial determination of a statement's reliability absent the cross-27
examination of the declarant fails to satisfy the Confrontation Clause.

Testimonial statements must be subject to cross-examination not only

21

See Leonard Birdsong, The Residual Exception to the Hearsay Rule

Has it Been

Abused A Survey Since the 1997 Amendment, 26 NOVA L. REV. 59, 61 (2001) (describing
academic concern residual exception would "abuse traditional concepts of evidence").
22 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004). The open-ended nature of Roberts was especially troubling to the
Court because such an amorphous standard allowed courts too much discretion. Id. at 67-68.
The majority found that "[b]y replacing categorical constitutional guarantees with open-ended
balancing tests, [the Court will] do violence to [the Framers'] design. Vague standards are
manipulable .... Id.
23

Id. at 38.

24 Id. at 40; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060 (1994) ("A spouse or domestic partner

shall not be examined for or against his or her spouse or domestic partner, without the consent of
the spouse or domestic partner ....). Despite this privilege, prosecutors may seek to enter a
spouse's out-of-court statements if they are admissible under a hearsay exception. See State v.
Burden, 841 P.2d 758, 761 (Wash. 1992) (en banc) ("[T]he [marital] testimonial privilege [is] not
served by excluding third person testimony of a spouse's extrajudicial statements and ...the
admission of such testimony does not violate [the marital privilege law].").
25 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40.
The appellate court admitted the statements under Rule
804(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Evidence for statements against penal interest, and found that
corroborating circumstances were sufficient to satisfy the Confrontation Clause under Roberts.
State v. Crawford, No. 25307-1-I, 2001 WL 850119, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. July 20, 2001).
26 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69.
27 Id. at 62.
The Court found that while the Framers would certainly approve of some
judicial flexibility, they clearly dictated that defendants must have an opportunity for crossexamination if testimonial statements by unavailable witnesses are to be admitted. See id. at 61,
68 (describing Framers' attitudes toward testimony of unavailable declarants).
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because judicial assessment of reliability is unpredictable, but also because
courts might mistakenly admit "core testimonial statements that the
Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude." 28
To restore the
protections against false testimony offered by the procedure, the Court
ruled a defendant must have the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses

regarding their
out-of-court testimonial statements in order for them to be
29
admissible.

Leaving room for the admission of some out-of-court statements
made by unavailable declarants, Justice Scalia distinguished testimonial
statements from non-testimonial statements in the Crawford opinion.'g
Although the Court offered a number of formulations, it left the
"comprehensive definition of 'testimonial"' to future decisions, ruling that

the statements at bar-statements taken by police officers in the course of
interrogation-fit the definition under any standard.3 Additionally, Justice
Scalia left the definition of "interrogation" open, suggesting only that he
intended
the term "in its colloquial, rather than any technical legal,
,,32
sense.
In his concurrence, Justice Rehnquist criticized the

28

Id. at 61, 63. Justice Scalia noted the irony that a Roberts analysis may well have admitted

Lord Cobham's testimony in Sir Walter Raleigh's trial. Id. at 62.
29 Id. at 61 ("[W]e impose an absolute bar to statements that are testimonial, absent a prior
opportunity to cross-examine .... "). To be admissible, out-of-court statements offered to prove
their truth must meet a hearsay exception and satisfy Crawford's requirements. Id. at 68.
30 See id. at 51-52 (suggesting "off-hand, overheard remarks" do not implicate Confrontation
Clause, but may remain inadmissible hearsay).
31 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52:
Various formulations of this core class of "testimonial" statements exist: "exparte incourt testimony or its functional equivalent-that is, material such as affidavits,
custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to crossexamine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be
used prosecutorially,"; "extrajudicial statements . .. contained in formalized
testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions,";
[and] ... "statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at
a later trial,".
Id. (citations omitted). This broad range of possible definitions resulted in overwhelming
criticism throughout the legal community. See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Grappling with the
Aleaning of "Testimonial", 71 BROOK. L. REV. 241 passim (2005) (criticizing Crawford'sfailure
to define "testimonial"); Adam Silberlight, Confronting a Testimonial Definition in a PostCrawford Era, 29 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 65 passim (2005) (same); Jeffrey A. Zick, Rethinking
Confrontation,ARIZ. ATT'Y, Sept. 2006 at 1, 30 (same).
32 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53 n.4 (leaving precise definition of "interrogation" for later
consideration). Commentators immediately seized upon this omission as a source of potential
confusion. See Miguel A. Mendez, Crawford v. Washington: A Critique, 57 STAN. L. REV. 569,
602 n.187 (2004) (considering range of law enforcement interactions people might consider
interrogations). Moreover, this scant advice left courts with little guidance about whose
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testimonial/nontestimonial distinction, arguing that it not only lacked
historical basis, but also that leaving these definitions unresolved left lower
courts and prosecutors "in the dark."33
B. The SJC Stacks Sandbags: Commonwealth v. Gonsalves
As Justice Rehnquist predicted in his concurring opinion in
Crawford, the SIC quickly found itself stumbling in the dark with
Commonwealth v. Gonsalves: a case Crawford controlled but could not be
resolved without further interpretation of what constituted a "testimonial"
statement or an "interrogation. ' 4 In its decision, the SIC noted that it had
insufficient guidance from the Supreme Court to determine whether
statements made to persons other than law enforcement officers or
statements spontaneously offered should be considered testimonial.3 5 In its
attempt to refine the definition of "testimonial," the SIC drew another

distinction, parsing a line between statements that are testimonial per se
and those that are testimonial in fact.3 6 Statements are testimonial per se
when they are made in response to police interrogations.3 7 Alternatively,

perspective-the declarant or the interrogator determined whether an exchange qualified as an
interrogation. See id.
33 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 75-76 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
Justice
Rehnquist would have left Roberts untouched, and disagreed with Justice Scalia's interpretation
of testimonial statements beyond sworn affidavits and depositions. Id. at 71-72, 75. From Justice
Rehnquist's perspective, excluding testimonial statements altogether was irrational-the law was
as unsettled at the Framers' time as it is today. Id. at 71-74.
34 See Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549, 554 (Mass. 2005) (describing
limitations of Crawford). In Gonsalves, the defendant and his girlfriend had an argument in the
girlfriend's bedroom while the girlfriend's mother was in another room. Id. at 552. Her mother
entered the room, and the declarant, in tears, described how the defendant hit her and grabbed her
shirt so tightly that she could not breathe. Id. Later, police arrived because of a report of a
domestic disturbance and asked the women what had happened. Id. The girlfriend told the
officers that the defendant "grabbed her by the neck, lifted her off the ground, choked her, and hit
her head on the floor." Id. She also provided the police with the defendant's name and his
physical description. Id. at 552-53. Based on those statements, Massachusetts charged
Gonsalves with assault and battery. Id. at 553. At trial, the girlfriend invoked her Fifth
Amendment rights and refused to testify. Id. Nevertheless, the prosecutor sought admission of
the statements she made to her mother and to the police after the defendant left the scene. Id.
The court granted Gonsalves's motion to suppress the statements, finding that they were
testimonial under Crawford. Id. The Commonwealth sought an interlocutory appeal, and the
SJC elected to address the matter. Id.
35 Id. at 554.
36 Id. at 557.
37 Id. at 555. The court interpreted the term "interrogation ... expansively to mean all
law
enforcement questioning related to the investigation or prosecution of a crime." Id.; see also
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 833 N.E.2d 134, 135 (Mass. 2005) (ruling any statements arising
from law enforcement questioning are testimonial per se). This interpretation includes "whether
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statements are testimonial in fact when they are made under circumstances
that the "declarant would reasonably believe that his or her statement might
be used at trial. 38 Neither formulation relies upon "the declarant's
knowledge of trial procedure or the formality of the statement," but instead
"focuses on the declarant's intent by evaluating the specific circumstances
in which the out-of-court statement is made." 3 9 From this viewpoint, "all
statements the declarant knew or should have known might be used to

investigate or prosecute an accused" are testimonial. 40 No other state has
explicitly adopted the testimonial-per-se/testimonial-in-fact distinction as
part of their Crawford analysis.
The SJC also struggled to ascertain what Justice Scalia described
as the "colloquial" understanding of interrogation, settling upon "all law
enforcement questioning related to the investigation or prosecution of a

the statement is part of an affidavit, deposition, confession, or prior testimony at a preliminary
hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial, or if it was procured through law enforcement
interrogation." Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d at 558.
38 Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d at 557 ("Crawford at least suggests that the determinative factor
in determining whether a declarant bears testimony is the declarant's awareness or expectation
that his or her statements may later be used at a trial."' (quoting United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d
223, 228-29 (2d Cir. 2004)). Not all state courts arrived at the same conclusion. See Hammon v.
State, 809 N.E.2d 945, 952 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), vacated, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005), cert.
granted, 546 U.S. 976 (2005), rev 'd and remanded sub nom. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813

(2006) ("It appears to us that the common denominator underlying the Supreme Court's
discussion of what constitutes a 'testimonial' statement is the official and formal quality of such a
statement.").
39 Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d at 558. The SJC also considered other courts' interpretations,
namely that the purpose of the statement was the controlling factor (without clarifying whose
purpose-the interrogator's or the declarant's). Id. at 557-58; see also People v. West, 823
N.E.2d 82, 91-92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (specific content, purpose, and facts surrounding each
statement relevant to analysis); People v. Cortes, 781 N.Y.S.2d 401, 414-15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004)
(discussing purpose of statement in evaluating testimonial nature).
40 Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d at 558. While statements are evaluated on a case-by-case analysis,
several factors may be relevant to establishing whether a statement is testimonial in fact,
including:
1. to whom was the statement made;
2. whether the statement was made in a public or private setting;
3. the emotional temperature of the declarant and the would-be witness;
4. the motivation behind the out-of-court statement (i.e., whether it was made to stop
an ongoing emergency or to provide information related to past events);
5. fully develop the circumstances;
6. whether police were present;
7. the content of the statement at issue; and
8. whether the out-of-court statement was unsolicited or responsive to questioning.
David A. Lowy & Katherine Bowles Dudich, After Crawford: Using the Confrontation Clause in
Massachusetts Courts, 12 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APp. ADvOC. 1, 25 (2007) (citing Commonwealth
v. Kartell, No. 1999-0655, 2005 WL 2739786, at *10 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 25, 2005)).
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crime." 41 Under this broad definition, a law enforcement officer's
preliminary fact-gathering to determine if a crime has taken place is an
interrogation, and the statements those interrogations elicit are
testimonial.4 2 The SJC refused to limit the scope of testimony to "formal,
solemnized, recorded accounts," arguing law enforcement officers would
attempt to circumvent the Confrontation
Clause by taking statements in the
43
most informal circumstances possible.
Because not all statements made to police are related to the

investigation or prosecution of a crime, the SJC created an exception to its
broad definition of "interrogation. 44 When police ask questions in the
course of ongoing emergencies-to secure volatile scenes or provide
medical care-those questions do not qualify as interrogations, and so,
under Gonsalves, they were not definitively testimonial per se;
nevertheless, courts could still categorize these statements as testimonial in
45
fact.
The Gonsalves Court also had to address another scenario unlike
the fact pattern addressed by the Supreme Court in Crawford: the
circumstances under which statements from one private citizen to another
might be considered testimonial. 46 While those statements could never
"

41 Consalves, 833 N.E.2d at 554-55 (considering alternate definitions of"interrogation").

42 See id. at 561 (finding preliminary fact gathering falls under scope of testimony). Justice
Sosman, in her concurrence, strongly disagreed with the SJC's broad interpretation, arguing that
it would cause confusion among the lower courts. See id. at 564 (Sosman, J., concurring in part)
(suggesting court distinguish between preliminary questioning and interrogation); see also Rim
Bhatnagar, The Pragmatic Jurist's Approach to the Confrontation Clause: Justice Alartha B.
Sosman's Concurrence in Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 42 NEW ENG. L. REv. 485, 492-93
(2008) (explaining difficulties arising from Gonsalves's broad definition of "interrogation");
Morgan M. Long, Commonwealth v. Gonsalves: Erroneously Expanding the Concept of Police
Interrogation Set Forth in Crawford v. Washington to Include Investigatory Police
Interrogations,33 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 171 passim (2007) (arguing
Gonsalves'sdefinition of "interrogation" is overbroad).
43 See Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d at 555 (rejecting formality of circumstances as criterion for
identifying interrogations). Justice Sosman disagreed, contending formality was a valuable
criterion for identifying interrogations. See id. at 564-65 (Sosman, J., concurring in part)
(suggesting "interrogation" connotes formal, structured interview).
44 See id. at 556 ("[T]he government's peacekeeping or community caretaking function [is]
'totally divorced from the detection, investigation or acquisition of evidence relating to the
violation of a criminal statute."' (quoting Commonwealth v. Evans, 764 N.E.2d 841, 844 (Mass.
2002))). This peacekeeping function is implicated when "'there is an objectively reasonable basis
for believing that the safety of an individual or the public is jeopardized. " Id. (quoting
Commonwealth v. Brinson, 800 N.E.2d 1032, 1037 (Mass. 2003)).
45 See id. at 557 (ordering testimonial-in-fact analysis for statements made to law
enforcement during ongoing emergencies); see also Commonwealth v. Foley, 833 N.E.2d 130,
133 (Mass. 2005) (subjecting statements made to law enforcement officer during ongoing
emergency to testimonial-in-fact analysis).
46 See Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d at 561-62 (evaluating whether declarant's statements to her
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qualify as testimonial per se, the SIC ruled they were nevertheless subject
to testimonial-in-fact analysis.47 While the victim's statements to her
mother in Gonsalves were nontestimonial, the court admitted there could be
circumstances where a reasonable declarant would expect his statements to

be used against the accused at trial, even though the listener was not a
member of the law enforcement community. 48
C. The Supreme Court Stems the Tide: Davis v. Washington
The open definitions of "testimonial" and "interrogation" led to a
number of discordant interpretations, and the Supreme Court soon took up
the matter again in Davis v. Washington.49 In Davis, the Court sought to
resolve the conundrum of how to analyze ambiguous statements that could
both address ongoing emergencies and convey information relevant to
future prosecution.50 Justice Scalia, again writing for the Court, introduced
the Primary Purpose Test:
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary
purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an
ongoing emergency.
They are testimonial when the circumstances
objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the

mother were testimonial). Scholars have also considered that statements to private citizens may
well be testimonial. See Jeffrey L. Fisher, What Happened and What is Happening to the
Confrontation Clause, 15 J.L. & POL'Y 587, 616-26 (2007) (considering testimonial nature of
statements made to persons other than law enforcement officers); Mendez, supra note 32, at 603
(same). Whether statements to employees of private victims' services organizations, medical
personnel, or children's statements to their parents are testimonial remains unresolved. See
Fisher, supra, at 616-26 (discussing confusion among courts regarding categorization of
statements between private actors); Mendez, supra note 32, at 603 (same).
47 Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d at 561-62 (considering whether victim's statements to her mother
were testimonial).
48 See id. (suggesting other declarants could make testimonial statements to private citizens).
The court reasoned that because the victim made the statements to her mother in her bedroom,
without knowledge that law enforcement officers were on their way or intending to file a
complaint, a reasonable person in the victim's shoes would not expect the statements to establish
a basis for prosecution against the defendant. Id. at 562.
49 547 U.S. 813, 823 (2006) (admitting Crawford was imprecise).
50 Id. For example, law enforcement officers arriving at a crime scene might ask a bystander
about what happened and get a response that both seeks emergency help and identifies a criminal
suspect. Id. If the court characterized the response as an off-hand remark under Crawford, it
might rule the victim's statement is nontestimonial. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,
51 (2004) (excepting off-hand remarks from characterization as testimony). Alternatively,
another court might characterize the statement as the fruit of an interrogation, and noting its
relevance to future prosecution, rule the statement is testimonial. See id. at 52 (characterizing
statements elicited from law enforcement interrogations as testimonial).
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primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. 51
The Davis Court also used several criteria to determine if an
exchange occurred during an ongoing emergency, including "the level of
formality" of the interview.52 In Gonsalves, the SJC explicitly rejected this

as a criterion for determining if a statement was testimonial, arguing it
would encourage law enforcement officers to take statements under
informal circumstances to circumvent the Confrontation Clause.53
D. Massachusetts'sPatchworkHolds (Mostly): Commonwealth v. Simon
The Davis Court's broad definition of "interrogation" and adoption
of an ongoing emergency exception affirmed that the SJC's interpretation
of Crawford in Gonsalves was largely accurate.54 However, the Davis
Court made one distinction in its ongoing emergency exception that the
SJC did not: once a statement qualified for the exception, the court could
not subsequently categorize it as testimonial.55 The SJC reacted to the
distinction raised in Davis in Commonwealth v. Simon 56 by melding the
two-part procedure it constructed in Gonsalves with the Supreme Court's
rules from Davis.5 7 In Simon, a gunshot victim called 911 to report his
injury. 58 The SJC considered whether the victim's statements to the 911
dispatcher were testimonial using the framework it developed in
51 Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
52 Id. at 827. The Court also considered the following: (1) whether the declarant made the
statements as they were actually happening; (2) whether a reasonable listener would understand
the declarant was facing an ongoing emergency; and (3) whether what was asked and answered,
viewed objectively, was necessary to resolve the emergency rather than merely learn what
happened in the past. Id.
53 See Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d at 555 (considering ramifications of identifying formality as
indicator of interrogation); id. at 564-65 (Sosman, J., concurring in part) (suggesting interrogation
connotes formal and structured interview).
54 See supra Part II.B (discussing SJC's interpretation of Crawford in Gonsalves).
55 See Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 (ruling statements made during ongoing emergencies are
nontestimonial).
56 923 N.E.2d 58 (Mass. 2010).
57 See id. at 73-74 (discussing effects of Davis on Massachusetts two-step Confrontation
Clause analytical procedure developed in Gonsalves).
58 Id. at 62. The victim told the 911 dispatcher that he had been robbed, that he and his
brother had been shot, and that he recognized his assailant. Id. at 62-63. Despite his serious
wounds, the victim provided the dispatcher the defendant's first name, a physical description of
the defendant, a description of the defendant's automobile, and the location where the defendant
worked out. Id. at 63. The victim died of causes unrelated to the case before trial, becoming
unavailable. Id. at 62 n.2. The defendant sought a motion in limine to suppress the victim's
statements to the 911 dispatcher, and the SJC transferred the case from the appeals court on its
own motion. Id. at 64.
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Gonsalves.59 Recognizing the effects of Davis upon the Gonsalves test, the
SJC incorporated the emergency exception outlined in Davis into the
testimonial-per-se analysis, but ruled the emergency exception did not
affect testimonial-in-fact analysis.60 Among the criteria it adopted to
determine if conversations were interrogations, the SJC listed the "'level of
formality of the interview,"' despite its previously held concerns that it
might encourage law enforcement officers to elicit information from
witnesses in informal settings.6'
This revision attempted to resolve any discrepancies between
Massachusetts's two-step process and the guidance laid out by the Supreme
Court.6 2 The Davis decision had largely validated the emergency exception
outlined by the SJC in Gonsalves, but did not adopt the SJC's distinct twostep procedure. 63 Nonetheless, the SJC explicitly noted the two steps
outlined in Gonsalves remained the controlling procedure for statements
made to people other than law enforcement officers. 64

59 Id. at 73-76 (applying two-step Confrontation Clause analysis).
60 See id. at 73-74 ("Statements made in response to police questioning during an emergency

are testimonial per se unless the emergency exception, as defined in Davis, applies. To the extent
that the exception applies, the statements are not testimonial per se and they will not become
testimonial in fact in any circumstances. To the extent that the emergency exception does not
apply, statements made in response to police interrogation remain testimonial per se."). This
adjustment foreclosed the possibility that the Massachusetts interpretation would exclude more
statements than required by Davis. See Ann Hetherwick Pumphrey, Admissibility of Hearsay
Statements to Police: Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana, BOS. B.J., Nov./Dec. 2006,
at 17, 19 (considering effects of Davis on Gonsalves).
61 Compare Simon, 923 N.E.2d at 73 (quoting Commonwealth v. Galicia, 857 N.E.2d 463,
469 (Mass. 2006)) (weighing formality as criterion to determine if conversations were
interrogations), with Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549, 555 (Mass. 2005) (rejecting formality of
circumstances as criterion for identifying interrogations). This development validated Justice
Sosman's argument that the formality of the exchange between law enforcement officers and
declarants was valuable in discerning interrogations (and the testimonial statements that stem
from them) and other conversations (and their nontestimonial results). See supra note 43 and
accompanying text (describing Justice Sosman's view).
62 See Simon, 923 N.E.2d at 73 (adjusting Gonsalves's two-step test to match Davis).
63 Compare supra Part II.C. (discussing Davis's ongoing emergency exception), with
Commonwealth v. Simon, 923 N.E.2d 58, 73-74 (Mass. 2010) (describing emergency exception
created by SJC in Gonsalves). In fact, the Massachusetts Attorney General appealed to the
Supreme Court to narrow the definition of "interrogation" to include the formality of the
exchange as a criterion for determining whether an interrogation was testimonial, but the Court
denied certiorari in three separate cases, including Gonsalves. See Roger W. Kirst, Confrontation
Rules After Davis v. Washington, 15 J. L. & POL'Y 635, 651-52 (2007) (describing Supreme
Court's implicit validation of SJC's definition of "interrogation").
64 See Simon, 923 N.E.2d at 73 n.10 ("[B]oth steps of the test set forth in Commonwealth v.
Gonsalves, continue to apply to statements made to people other than law enforcement officers."
(citation omitted)).
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III. LEAKS IN THE DIKE: FURTHER HEARSAY AMBIGUITIES
APPEAR AFTER CRA WFORD AND DAVIS

A. Michigan v. Bryant
Critics quickly seized upon a further ambiguity left over by
Crawford and Davis: when a court is examining whether an interrogation
took place, should it consider the intent of the declarant, the interrogator, or
both? 65 While the Crawford decision focused largely upon the intent of a
reasonable declarant, the primary purpose test outlined in Davis focused on
the intent of the law enforcement officer. 6 6 To resolve this confusion, the
Supreme Court addressed the issue in Michigan v. Bryant.67 Justice

Sotomayor, writing for the majority, took an expansive approach, allowing
courts to consider the statements and actions of all participants to determine
the primary purpose of the interrogation.68
Warning against
misinterpretation, the Court carefully pointed out that "the declarant's
statements, not the interrogator's questions" control whether the statement
is testimonial. 69 The officer's primary purpose simply provides context the
court may use in its analysis of the declarant's statement. 70 Despite Justice

65

See Andrew C. Fine, Refining Crawford: The Confrontation Clause After Davis v.

Washington and Hammon v. Indiana, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 11, 11-12 (2006),
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/105/fine.pdf (suggesting unpredictable effects of
Davis's "amorphous" definition of interrogation); Tom Lininger, Reconceptualizing
ConfrontationAfter Davis, 85 Tx. L. REV. 271, 280 (2006) (describing theoretical and practical
difficulties remaining after Davis). But see Kirst, supra note 63, at 675 (suggesting Davis
removes confusion regarding interrogator and declarant intent by considering statements'
objective meaning).
66 See Lininger, supra note 65, at 280 (identifying focal shift from declarant to interrogator
as source of confusion).
67 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1157-66 (2011) (clarifying primary purpose test). In Bryant, the Supreme
Court considered whether a dying man's description of his attacker to the police was testimonial
under the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 1150.
68 Id. at 1162 ("[Courts are to] objectively ascertain[] the primary purpose of the
interrogation by examining the statements and actions of all participants .... ).
69 Id.
Whether a court considers the interrogator's intent is more than mere legal
hairsplitting. See Mark S. Coven & James F. Comerford, What's Going On? The Right to
Confrontation, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 269, 279 (2012). Because law enforcement officers
speaking to victims will always have prosecution at least partially in mind, courts are more likely
to exclude unavailable witnesses' accusatory statements if the officer's intent is controlling. Id.
("By evaluating the interrogator's purpose, the defendant may receive a greater benefit than if
only the declarant's actions are examined: the exclusion of a declarant's statement unless the
requirements of the Confrontation Clause are satisfied.").
70 See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1162. Justice Scalia dissented in Bryant, accusing the Court of
making itself "the obfuscator of last resort." Id. at 1168 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He contended the
majority grossly misread Crawford and Davis, arguing it "did not address whose perspective
matters-the declarant's, the interrogator's, or both when assessing 'the primary purpose of [an]
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Sotomayor's clear guidance to focus on the purpose of the statement,
limiting consideration of the interrogator's purpose to a contextual guide,
some critics still warn against law enforcement's manipulation of
circumstances to avoid characterization of statements as testimonial by the
courts .7

The Bryant decision clarified the Crawford and Davis decisions:
statements to law enforcement officers are testimonial when the
circumstances would indicate to a reasonable person that they would be
used in a subsequent criminal prosecution against the accused. 2 When the
circumstances indicate there is an ongoing emergency, the declarant's
statements are not testimonial for the purposes of Confrontation Clause
analysis.73
B. The Flow is Stymied: Effects of Bryant on Massachusetts Courts
Massachusetts implemented the Bryant rule with little fanfare in
Commonwealth v. Smith. 74 In this case, police investigating an armed
robbery knocked on a suspect's apartment door, but no one answered. 75 As
they were leaving, the defendant's girlfriend burst out of the apartment and
appeared to be "'visibly shaken,' 'very nervous,' and 'frantic.' 7 6 Without
prompting, she told the police that the defendant had a gun and that he was
wrapping it in a black sock. 7 7 At trial, the prosecution, unable to locate the
girlfriend, sought to have the police testify to her statements. 78 These facts
presented a conundrum to the court: when the police arrived at the

interrogation. "' Id. (alteration in original). Justice Scalia's vehemence is curious: as the author
of the Davis opinion, he was responsible for the primary purpose test's focus on the primary
purpose of the interrogation rather than the primary purpose of the statements elicited by the
interrogation. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 (introducing primary purpose test). Regardless, both
the Bryant Court and Justice Scalia agreed: courts should focus upon the declarant rather than the
interrogator. Compare Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1162 (focusing on declarant's statements, not
interrogator's questions), with id. at 1168 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The declarant's intent is what
counts.").
71 See Jason Widdison, Michigan v. Bryant: The Ghost of Roberts and the Return of
Reliability, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 219, 235 (2011) (suggesting police will delay response to
emergencies to secure nontestimonial statements under ongoing emergency exception).
72 See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1154 (citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 822) (elaborating on meaning of
"testimonial").
73 Id. (stating difference based on context).
74 951 N.E.2d 674, 681-82 (Mass. 2011) (considering whether declarations meet Bryant's
ongoing emergency criteria).
75 Id. at 679 (describing facts of incident in question).
76 Id.
77

Id. at 680.

78 Id.
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apartment, it was clear they did not believe there was an emergency; their
primary purpose was to conduct an investigation for later criminal
prosecution. 79 However, the circumstances indicated that the girlfriend had
a different purpose: to alert the police to an immediate danger.80 Applying
guidance they received from the Bryant Court, the SIC considered whether
"'the primary purpose of [the] interrogation [was] to enable police
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.' 8 Notably, the SIC did not
conduct a Gonsalves-type testimonial-per-se or testimonial-in-fact
analysis.82 No clear trend of when courts will use the testimonial per se/in

fact rubric has emerged; some Massachusetts courts continue to use this
analysis, while others simply cite the case without explicitly going through
the steps.83 Still others forego reliance upon Gonsalves
altogether in their
4

consideration of a statement's testimonial value.

IV. REDUNDANT PATCHWORK: THE GONSALVES DECISION HAS
BECOME IRRELEVANT
The SIC first developed its two-part Confrontation Clause
analytical procedure in Gonsalves in response to Crawford, a case that was

79 Smith, 951 N.E.2d at 682 (stating defendant's arguments that primary purpose was
investigation, not emergency response).
80 Id. at 683.

81 Id. at 682 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006)). The court found that
the girlfriend's statements were nontestimonial under the ongoing emergency exception. Id. at
684.
82 See Smith, 951 N.E.2d at 681-84 (relying upon Crawford Davis Bryant trilogy to
determine if declarant's statements to police were testimonial). The SJC paid passing homage to
its own jurisprudence, briefly citing the Simon and Galicia decisions and listing factors courts
might consider in determining if an emergency exists, but it did not use the holdings from either
case to arrive at its conclusion. See id. at 681-82.
83 See Commonwealth v. Patterson, 946 N.E.2d 130, 134-35 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011) (citing
Crawford, Davis, and Bryant as controlling authority for Confrontation Clause analysis). In
Patterson, the court evaluated statements a child made to officers investigating a domestic
violence report. Id. at 132. The court cited Gonsalves, but only as supporting authority and
without conducting a two-step analysis. Id. at 134-35. Compare Commonwealth v. Linton, 924
N.E.2d 722, 737 (Mass. 2010) (using Gonsalves's two-step analysis to determine if declarant's
statements were testimonial), and Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 946 N.E.2d 142, 150-51 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2011) (applying two-part Gonsalves test), and Commonwealth v. Shangkuan, 943
N.E.2d 466, 473-75 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011) (using two-step Gonsalves analysis to determine if
statements testimonial), with Commonwealth v. Cheremond, 961 N.E.2d 97, 108 (Mass. 2012)
(citing Gonsalves without considering whether declarant's statements were testimonial in fact or
testimonial per se).
84 See Commonwealth v. Beatrice, 951 N.E.2d 26, 31-35 (Mass. 2011) (resolving whether
statements were testimonial without citing Gonsalves or using its two-step analysis);
Commonwealth v. Taber, No. 10-P-1527, 2012 WL 177769, at *2 (Mass. App. Ct. Jan. 24, 2012)
(same).
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heavily criticized for leaving too many questions unanswered.85 At the
time, this process seemed necessary.8 6 However, in light of Davis and
Bryant, recent Massachusetts decisions indicate the procedure has become
increasingly moot in cases where the court evaluates statements to law
enforcement officers .87
The Massachusetts response to Crawford in Gonsalves closely
mirrored the Supreme Court's subsequent interpretation of the right to
confrontation.88 Crawfordleft open the question of whose intent controlled
the determination of whether a statement was testimonial.89 Both the SJC
and the Supreme Court later held that statements are testimonial when a
reasonable person in the declarant's position would anticipate the statement
would be used against the accused in investigating and prosecuting a
crime. 90 Crawford also left open the question of when statements made to
police should be considered testimonial. 91 Both courts determined that if
statements are made primarily to obtain help during an emergency, they are
not testimonial. 92 Lastly, the Crawford Court left open the question of how

judges should consider the questions and procedures used by law
enforcement officers and others to elicit statements from declarants. 93 Both
courts decided that while law enforcement's questions should be used to

inform a judge's ruling on whether the declarant's responses are
testimonial, the focus of the analysis is on a reasonable declarant's intent
under the circumstances. 94
85 See Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549, 554 (Mass. 2005) (evaluating open
definition of "testimonial" after Crawford).
86 See Mendez, supra note 33, at 587-88 (outlining uncertainties left by Crawford).
87 See cases cited supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing Gonsalves's application
in recent Massachusetts appellate decisions).
88 See supra Part I (discussing federal and Massachusetts Confrontation Clause jurisprudence
after Crawford); see also Bhatnagar, supra note 42, at 493 (noting Supreme Court's Davis
decision matched with SJC's preceding interpretation in Gonsalves).
89 See Mendez, supra note 32, at 602 n. 187 (describing failures of Crawford and academic
criticism).
90 Compare Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1162 (2011) (describing
objective, contextdriven analysis courts use to characterize declarant's statements as testimonial), with Gonsalves,
833 N.E.2d at 555-56 (describing objective, context-driven analysis SJC developed to determine
if statements are testimonial-in-fact).
91 See Mendez, supra note 32, at 602 n.187 and accompanying text (addressing ambiguity
when questioning by police officers is not considered interrogation).
92 Compare Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 (explaining statements made to police to secure

emergency help are nontestimonial), with Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d at 555-56 (characterizing
statements made to secure "volatile" scenes or establish need for medical care as nontestimonial).
93 See Mendez, supra note 32, at 587-89 (outlining uncertainties left by Crawford).
94 Compare Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1162 (explaining testimonial qualities are determined using
objective intents of both declarant and police), with Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d at 558 (deciding to
objectively evaluate declarant's statements in context with statements and actions of listener).
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While both the SJC's and the Supreme Court's principles are
harmonious, their processes are not; unlike the Supreme Court, the SIC
created a two-step procedure to determine when statements are
testimonial. 95 First, Massachusetts courts determine if a statement is
testimonial per se, and if not, the court determines if the statement is
testimonial in fact. 9 6 The Supreme Court has instead eschewed developing
specific procedures, electing to develop the boundaries of testimonial
statements on a case-by-case basis without further segmenting the types of
statements through procedural devices. 97 Because Massachusetts has
adopted a distinct procedure each time the Supreme Court refines the
definition of testimonial, the SIC must adjust its own test to comply. 98
This difference in analyses has resulted in two major changes since
the SIC rendered Gonsalves.99 First, the Davis decision incorporated the
formality of the circumstances as a criterion of courts' evaluations of
exchanges between law enforcement officers and declarants; a concept the
SIC had considered, but rejected.100 Second, the Davis Court held that
statements made to law enforcement officers are nontestimonial if the
declarant is seeking assistance during an ongoing emergency.101
Massachusetts trial courts were obliged to subject such statements to
further analysis under Gonsalves, leading to the possibility that those
statements may be characterized as testimonial during the second step of
the analysis.10 2 Today, Massachusetts courts must examine, specifically in
the context of statements made to law enforcement officers, whether the
statement is testimonial per se, and if it is, whether the statement was made
to secure help during an emergency. 03 If the statement qualifies for this
emergency exception, then courts may not subsequently characterize it as
See Commonwealth v. Shangkuan, 943 N.E.2d 466, 473 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011) (noting
Massachusetts process for evaluating testimonial statements is distinct from federal procedure).
96 See Commonwealth v. Simon, 923 N.E.2d 58, 73-74 (discussing Gonsalves's two-step
95

analysis); Pumphrey, supra note 60, at 19 (considering Gonsalves analysis).
97 See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1156 (prescribing fact-driven analysis to determine if statements
are testimonial).
98 See Commonwealth v. DeOliveira, 849 N.E.2d 218, 221 n.1 (Mass. 2006) (noting SJC
chose not to develop distinct confrontation rights under state law).
99 See supra Part II.D (discussing SJC's adjustment of testimony analysis post-Gonsalves).
100 See Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549, 555 (Mass. 2005) (discussing SJC's
rejection of formality of circumstances as a criterion for identifying interrogations).
101 See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (describing ongoing emergency

exception).

102 See Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d at 557 (describing Gonsalves's requirement that statements to
police during emergencies undergo testimonial in fact analysis); Commonwealth v. Foley, 833
N.E.2d 130, 133 (Mass. 2005) (same), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 927 (2006).
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See Pumphrey, supra note 60, at 19 (describing effect of Davis on Confrontation Clause

analysis in Massachusetts).
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testimonial in fact.
Today, Massachusetts courts evaluating statements made to law
enforcement officers under Gonsalves first consider whether they are
testimonial per se, and then, in accordance with Simon, they determine if
the emergency exception applies. 105 After Simon, this initial categorization
is superfluous: the testimonial-per-se/testimonial-in-fact distinction no
longer has any effect in this context because once the court determines the
ongoing emergency exception applies, the statements are no longer subject
to further analysis under the testimonial-in-fact rubric. 10 6 In practice,
courts can simply ask if a reasonable person in the declarant's position
would anticipate that law enforcement officers would use the statement
against the accused in investigating and prosecuting a crime. 10 7 Courts
conducting this fact-driven analysis objectively evaluate all the facts and
circumstances surrounding the statement, including the intent of reasonable
persons in the parties' positions and the formality of the encounter, to
determine if the statement qualifies as an ongoing emergency. 10" Given the
amount of confusion associated with post-Crawford Confrontation Clause
cases, Massachusetts should avoid adding steps to the process whenever
possible. 109
The SIC has noted that this two-step procedure remains the
appropriate method for determining whether statements made to persons

other than law enforcement officers are testimonial because the Supreme
Court has not ruled on such a case. ii0 As in cases where statements are

104

See id. (describing Simon's rule foreclosing statements qualifying for ongoing emergency

exception from testimonial-in-fact analysis); see also Commonwealth v. Simon, 923 N.E.2d 58,
73 (2010) ("To the extent that the [emergency] exception applies, the statements are not
testimonial per se and they will not become testimonial in fact in any circumstances.").
105 See Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d at 554-57 (describing two-step process); Pumphrey, supra
note 60, at 19 and accompanying text (describing effects of Simon on Gonsalves's process); see
also Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 833 N.E.2d 134, 135 (Mass. 2005) (ruling statements arising
from law enforcement questioning are testimonial per se).
106 See Pumphrey, supra note 60, at 19 and accompanying text (describing present
Confrontation Clause analysis).
107 See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1160 (2011) (dictating inquiry courts should
use
to determine whether statements are testimonial).
108 See id. (describing factors courts should consider in testimonial inquiry).
109 See Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d at 554-57 (demonstrating confusion associated with post-

Crawford Confrontation Clause analysis).
110 See Commonwealth v. Simon, 923 N.E.2d 58, 73 n.10 (Mass. 2010) (instructing courts to
use two-step analysis when emergency exception does not apply). Compare Gonsalves, 833
N.E.2d at 561-62 (evaluating statements declarant made to her mother), with Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at
1163-67 (analyzing statements made to police), and Davis, 547 U.S. at 826-32 (analyzing
statements made to 911 operator and to police), and Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 65-66
(2004) (analyzing statements declarant made to police).
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made to law enforcement officers, no genuine procedural difference exists
when declarants make statements to persons other than law enforcement
officers because they simply cannot be testimonial per se.111 Testimonialper-se statements include affidavits, depositions, confessions, or prior
testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial,
or statements procured through law enforcement interrogation, but not
statements made to persons other than law enforcement. 112 If statements
made to persons other than law enforcement officers cannot be testimonial
per se under the Massachusetts procedure, then the only remaining analysis
is whether the statements are testimonial in fact, which is merely an
3
analysis of whether the statement is testimonial at all. 11
The Supreme Court has not addressed a post-Crawford case
involving a contested statement made to a private citizen, but the principles
of analysis that emerged from the Crawford-Davis-Bryanttrilogy are the
substantive equivalent of those settled upon by the SIC in Gonsalves and
Simon."
Both the Supreme Court and the SIC decisions agree that
statements are testimonial when the primary purpose of a reasonable person
in the declarant's position would be to establish or prove facts relevant to a
later criminal prosecution. "' The only distinction remaining is that while
the federal jurisprudence considers the formality of the circumstances, the
Massachusetts lineage arguably does not. 116 In Gonsalves, the SIC
determined that the formality of the circumstances is not relevant to the
determination of whether a statement is testimonial because it was
concerned that police would purposefully keep circumstances informal. 117
The SIC later abandoned this rationale in Simon, adopting the formality of
the circumstances as a relevant criterion per the Supreme Court's
III See Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d at 557-58 (omitting statements of private citizens from list of
testimonial per se statements).
112 See id. (outlining statements that are testimonial per se).
113 See id. (explaining Gonsalves'stwo step analysis and meaning of "testimonial in fact").
114 See generally Parts II. and III. (describing Crawford, Davis, and Bryant rationales, and
their effects on Massachusetts jurisprudence).
115 Compare Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1162 ([W]hen a court must determine whether the
Confrontation Clause bars the admission of a statement at trial, it should determine the 'primary
purpose of the interrogation' by objectively evaluating the statements and actions of the parties to
the encounter, in light of the circumstances in which the interrogation occurs."), with
Commonwealth v. Smith, 951 N.E.2d 674, 682 (Mass. 2011) (adopting Bryant's definition for
testimonial per se analysis).
116 Compare Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 827 (2006) (describing Davis's adoption of
formality of circumstances in evaluating potentially testimonial statements), with Fisher, supra
note 46, at 616 (describing SJC's limitation of the Davis holding to testimonial per se analysis),
and Mendez, supra note 32, at 603 (same).
117 See Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d at 555 (explaining rationale for rejecting formality as criterion
for identifying interrogations).
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instruction in Davis."8 That adoption, however, was limited to testimonial
per se analysis.119
Future Massachusetts courts that fail to consider the formality of
the circumstances surrounding statements to persons other than police in
testimonial-in-fact analyses are failing to consider that the Gonsalves Court
was concerned that police might intentionally manipulate the circumstances
to later persuade judicial bodies that a statement is nontestimonial (and
admissible under the Confrontation Clause), rather than testimonial
(necessitating cross examination). 120 Moreover, the Gonsalves analysis
itself indicated that the formality of the circumstances was relevant to its
determination that the victim's statements to her mother were
nontestimonial. 12 1 While choosing to overlook the formality of the
circumstances might seem simpler, as Justice Sotomayor noted in Bryant:
"simpler is not always better," and the formality of the circumstances is
relevant to the analysis. 22 Additionally, it is far simpler to have one rule
governing the evaluation of all statements that accounts for all
circumstances regardless of this audience, rather than a separate rule for
statements made to persons other than law enforcement officers that
ignores the formality of the circumstances. 121
After Bryant, it is clear that statements to law enforcement officers
are testimonial when the circumstances would indicate to a reasonable
person that they would be used in a subsequent criminal prosecution
against the accused. 124 When the circumstances that indicate there is an
ongoing emergency, the declarant's statements are not testimonial. 125 This
rule is applicable to any type of statement, not just those made to law
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See Commonwealth v. Simon, 923 N.E.2d 58, 73 -74 (Mass. 2010) (adopting formality of

circumstances as a relevant criteria in testimony per se analysis); Pumphrey, supra note 60, at 19
and accompanying text (same).
119 See Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d at 562 (describing SJC's limitation of the Davis holding
to
testimonial per se analysis).
120 See id. at 555 (explaining rationale for rejecting formality as a criterion for identifying
interrogations).
121 See id. at 561-62 (describing fact-based analysis court used to find victim's statements to
her mother nontestimonial).
122 See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1162 (2011) (suggesting that limiting judicial
discretion to consider all relevant facts would be unjustifiable restraint).
123 See THOMAS AQUINAS, BASIC WRITINGS OF SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS 129 (Anton C.
Pegis ed. 1945) ("If a thing can be done adequately by means of one, it is superfluous to do it by
means of several; for we observe that nature does not employ two instruments where one

suffices.").

124 See id. at 1154 (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006)) (elaborating on
the meaning of "testimonial").
125 See Davis v. Washington, 477 U.S. 813, 827 (2006) (describing ongoing emergency
exception).
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enforcement officers, because the context-driven analysis suggested by the
Court is broad enough to apply in all scenarios. 126 For example, some
statements, like affidavits, are easy to evaluate because they are likely
always testimonial, as the formal circumstances under which they are taken
would leave a reasonable person to expect them to be used later in criminal
prosecutions. 127 However, as the circumstances under which the statement
is made become less formal, but still involve law enforcement officers (i.e.,
911 calls and police interrogations), a context-driven fact-specific inquiry
becomes more difficult because reasonable people might disagree about
when a person might expect their statements to be used in a later criminal
proceeding.128 Lastly, when the contested statements are part of a private
conversation, the same context-driven analysis is appropriate, even if the
circumstances are more difficult to evaluate. 129 Regardless of the facts,
these evaluations should focus on whether a reasonable declarant under the
circumstances would expect the statements to be used against the accused
in a later criminal proceeding, and not whether the actual parties believed
the statements were admissible-the more formal the
circumstances, the
30
more likely the parties are reasonable in their belief 1
The SJC's failure to explicitly abandon the two-step process may
ultimately mislead and confuse Massachusetts's lower courts, even though
its Confrontation Clause jurisprudence requires an analysis that is
substantively equivalent to the Supreme Court's procedure-both are caseby-case examinations of the facts. 13'
As Massachusetts courts may
continue to apply additional steps to arrive at the same result, there is the
possibility of divergent developments in federal and state common laws in
the future; in fact, some Massachusetts courts have continued to rely upon
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See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1158-62 (suggesting courts should consider all relevant

circumstances to determine testimonial nature of statements).
127 See Commonwealth v. Simon, 923 N.E.2d 58, 73 (Mass. 2010) ("A statement is
testimonial per se if it was made in a formal or solenmized form .... ). The simplicity of this
test may lead courts to forego evaluating each statement in context a step the Bryant Court
discourages judges from overlooking. See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1159 (describing court's
omission of context-dependent analysis as a "failure").
128 See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1158-59 (listing factors that could inform context-driven
analysis). For example, courts might find the medical condition of the declarant, the formality of
the circumstances, or the existence of an ongoing emergency important factors to consider. Id. at
1159 (explaining that trial court should have considered declarant's medical condition).
129 See Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549, 561-62 (Mass. 2005) (conducting
fact-specific analysis of declarant's statements to her mother).
130 See Lowy & Dudich, supra note 40, at 25 (outlining criteria to determine when statement
is testimonial in fact).
131 See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1162 (describing Supreme Court approach as context driven);
Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d at 555-56 (describing SJC approach as context-driven).
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the Gonsalves analysis despite Bryant's applicability.
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V. CONCLUSION
Through the Crawford-Davis Bryant lineage, the Supreme Court
provided a working definition of "testimonial" that parallels, but does not
entirely overlap, the interpretation offered by the SIC in Gonsalves. The
federal cases only address statements made to government officials in the
course of criminal investigations, whereas the SIC and lower courts have
had to apply the federal doctrine to statements made to persons other than
government actors.
While both courts' definitions are harmonious,
Massachusetts requires an additional two-step analysis. The Supreme
Court has not evaluated Massachusetts's process in its decisions, but
nevertheless, the SIC has had to adjust the procedure to remain in step with
federal Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. While this procedure was
once valuable, it has become outdated in light of subsequent Supreme
Court decisions, and is becoming increasingly useless as federal
Confrontation Clause develops in the post-Crawford era.
All statements (including affidavits, 911 calls, and statements to
police officers and family members) are measurable against the current
federal standard. With Gonsalves's two-step process having no genuine
procedural effect and negligible (if any) substantive effect, courts
evaluating whether statements made to persons other than law enforcement
officers should abandon the procedure and simply rely upon the existing
common law without making a distinction between statements that are
testimonial per se and testimonial in fact. The court should ask: Would a
reasonable person in the declarant's shoes expect their statement to be used
against the defendant in a later criminal proceeding? If so, the statement is
testimonial, and the defendant must have the opportunity to cross-examine
the declarant.
ChristopherJ Fiorentino
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See Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 946 N.E.2d 142, 150-51 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011)

(evaluating declarant's statement to her doctor using Gonsalves's two-step Confrontation Clause
analysis). The court in Figueroa did not consider the Bryant ruling, published a month earlier, as
part of its analysis. Id. While Bryant may not have been expressly controlling, the court missed
the opportunity to support its analysis of the formality of the exchange with the Supreme Court's
recent exposition of the importance of formality as a factor in identifying testimonial statements.
See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1160 (discussing value of considering formality of conversation in
identifying testimonial statements).

